“Liebniz called beauty a ‘disinterested love’; Burke, a form of love that is ‘different from desire’. And this is not a sentiment confined to the Enlightenment. Marcus Aurelius said that ‘anything in any way beautiful derives its beauty from itself, and asks nothing beyond itself. In this it is not different from other values. Seneca, as is well known, asserted that virtue is its own reward; and Spinoza that not happiness, but virtue itself, as the prize of virtue. Values are not instrumental. That x has an effect y does not make y the purpose of x. For example, beauty relieves pain; but while that is a sign of its power, it does not explain the existence of beauty, or indicate that its purpose is analgesia.

In the words of Emily Dickinson,

Beauty — be not caused — It Is —

And she continues,

Chase it, and it ceases —
Chase it not, and it abides —

Since there is no formula for beauty, any more than there is for truth or goodness, it cannot be commanded, but must be wooed.
And it is certainly not just about things that make us feel comfortable and safe. ‘Beauty’ wrote Rilke, ‘is nothing but the onset of terror we can only just bear, and which we admire in awe because it serenely disdains to destroy us. In experiencing it as in experiencing truth, goodness and a sense of purpose — we are aware of being in the presence of something greater than ourselves.”

Iain McGilchrist, The Matter With Things, VII, Chapter 26 • Value, pp. 1151-1152