In a conversation today, someone said that verbal thinking or speech is the limit case of the ordinary set we refer to as experience; that is, an exception to or departure from experience. I felt that violated the category (verbal experience cannot be ‘not experience’) and he said that was true but trivial. Then, that private experience was the limit case of the ordinary set we refer to as the real. These prescriptions depend on verbal activity conflicting with embodied experience, and private experience conflicting with ‘the shared aspects of the real’ which are common (heat, pressure, light, and so on). I argued that they were not limit cases of experience or the real per se, but of -orders- of those sets. That is to say, verbal experience implies a departure to a less embodied order of experience, and private experience implies a departure to less communal orders of experience, rather than being absolute departures or violations (which destroy the meaning of the set if included in it), as was initially implied.