Generalizations are conveniences, that, while of some utility in their appropriate scope, are nearly completely invalid in specific situations. Because they collapse infinite complexities (infinite domains of complexity as well) into finitizations.

These appear authoritative to the untrained mind. They are, generally, the opposite of authoritative; especially in any situation with high ambiguity.

Their proposal is to reliably collapse infinities into finities. This entails that a finite proposition actually encompasses various infinities. This cannot be so.

This urge, again, a habit of convenience, orbits a fundamental error: the medians or ‘norms’ from generalizations derive (a sort of clumsy probability profile) are crude to begin with in most cases, and actual situations commonly have high local novelty.

So the projection of generalizations on specific phenomenon is, wherever inappropriately narrow, not a convenience at all. It is a catastrophic misapprehension.

Obviously, this statement is an example of generalization, yet its scope is limited to those instances of these kinds of statements where generalization is profoundly inappropriate, resulting in blindness, rather than insight.